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Recent banking crises demanded decisive actions from the authorities to protect 
the consumers, the taxpayers and the banking sector as a whole. Based on the European 
legislation from 2014 this paper intends to analyse the authorities’ decisions in Iceland 
and Ireland. We provide a brief summary of the environment during the crises and refer 
some possible causes. The problems with depositors on Icesave bank are also taken into 
account. The resolution processes are explored and authorities’ decisions for the main 
banks are analysed. Three aspects were chosen to evaluate resolutions such as the 
achievement of resolution objectives, past conditions met and resolution tools used, 
based on the European legislation principles, and decisions on individual institutions are 
analysed according these aspects. Some similarities were found such as the conditions 
met prior to the resolution, most resolution tools used and the achievement of greater 
financial stability after the process. We found differences regarding the tools utilized by 
the authorities notably the lack of “bail-in” for senior bondholders on Ireland case and 
the recapitalizations by the government were lower on Iceland. Despite the higher 
stability the protection of consumers was divergent, with Icelandic authorities covering 
only the depositors on the country and not foreign depositors on branches or 
subsidiaries belonging to Icelandic institutions. 
 
 
 Keywords:  Banking resolution, European legislation, Ireland, Iceland, bail-in, bail-
out, financial stability, consumer protection
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Crises bancárias recentes requerem ações decisivas por parte das autoridades de 
forma a proteger os consumidores, os contribuintes e o sector bancário como um todo. 
Tendo como base a legislação europeia de 2014 este trabalho tem como objetivo 
analisar as decisões das autoridades na Irlanda e Islândia. Elaborámos um breve sumário 
das condições envolventes durante as crises e referimos algumas causas possíveis. Os 
problemas sofridos pelos depositantes no banco Icesave também são tomados em 
consideração. Os processos de resolução são explorados e as decisões das autoridades 
relativas as principais bancos são analisados. Foram escolhidos três aspetos para avaliar 
resoluções tais como o cumprimento de objetivos de resolução, as condições prévias 
encontradas e os mecanismos de resolução utilizados, baseados nos princípios da 
legislação europeia, e análise das decisões tomadas em instituições de acordo com estes 
aspetos. Foram encontradas algumas semelhanças tais como as condições prévias ao 
processo de resolução, a maior parte dos mecanismos utilizados e foi alcançada uma 
maior estabilidade financeira depois do processo. Encontramos diferenças relativas aos 
mecanismos utilizados pelas autoridades particularmente a não utilização de “bail-in” 
para obrigações sénior no caso da Irlanda e as recapitalizações por parte do governo 
foram menores na Islândia. Apesar da maior estabilidade financeira a proteção dos 
consumidores foi diferente, as autoridades Islandesas apenas cobriram os depósitos no 
país e não depositantes estrangeiros em sucursais e filiais pertencestes a instituições 
Islandesas.  
Palavras-chave: Resolução bancária, legislação europeia, Irlanda, Islândia, bail-in, 
bail-out, estabilidade financeira, proteção dos consumidores. 
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1. Introduction 
Under scrutiny by academics, governments, press and general public the banking 
sector attained a lot of attention. Mostly motivated by mistrust caused by the recent 
financial crisis the banking sector and regulators receive criticism related to the 
resolution mechanisms applied in the crisis and the use of taxpayer money. 
It is crucial to note that the banking sector has many vital functions that are 
essential for several segments of the economy and society as a whole. Banking 
institutions receive savings from their clients, as saving account deposits or other types 
of deposits, and in return pay interests to the clients. They use these deposits to provide 
credit to firms or families. The banking sector also creates ways to manage risk for their 
clients by screening and diversifying the risk of investments and also providing faster 
and easier access to funds for borrowers (Pyle 1999 and Santomero 1997 among 
others).  
The importance of the financial sector and the banking sector in particular on the 
increment of economic growth is a well researched subject (for example by Beck et al 
2000, Valickova et al 2013 or Levine et al 2000). Based on the fundamental role of the 
banking sector on the real economy and the financial system the governments decided 
to use public funds during the financial crisis, focusing the need for resolution 
mechanisms to prevent and determine the best course of action during a collapse of 
banking institutions. 
 Financial crisis put a strain on the banking sector stability and the increasing 
interconnected financial system increased the burden have to bear. The risk of an 
individual institution failure can spread to other institutions and create widespread 
shocks (European Central Bank 2010). Banking resolution process aim to restructure 
failing institutions and maintain financial stability (European Commission 2014). 
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2. Literature Review 
 For the literature review three main aspects were studied the banking resolution 
processes per se, the systemic risk costs and the consumer protection mechanisms. 
Finally there is a brief review on the main points. 
2.1. Banking Resolution 
Banking resolutions take place when the authorities conclude that a financial 
institution is deteriorating and it is near insolvency. There circumstances where the 
authorities should go forward with an intervention are explained in the Regulation No. 
806/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council (2014a). Authorities should only 
intervene all the three conditions are observed: the institution is failing or it is expected 
to fail in a near future; alternative private sector or other kind of intervention are not 
enough to solve the problem whether because of time or another significant issues and 
finally regular insolvency procedures promote risk of financial instability, do not protect 
depositors, investors and clients interests and that resolutions implied a lower cost for 
the public funds. Both retail and investment institutions are covered in this directive, 
with the European Commission highlighting the investment institutions susceptibility to 
cause lack of confidence in the financial system as a whole.  
Resolution procedures should be in accordance to specific principles according 
to Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and the Council (2014b). Those 
principles are that the losses are supported by the shareholders first and after that by the 
creditors (except covered depositors and investors). These losses for the creditors cannot 
be higher than the expected losses in a regular liquidation process. Regarding the 
management body, it is required to assist in the procedure and it should be replaced 
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unless it is deemed necessary for the process. In addition legal actions should be taken 
against liable persons for the responsibility in the failure of the institution. 
According to the Regulation No. 806/2014 of the European Parliament and the 
Council (2014a) resolutions should strive for specific resolution objectives to be 
achieved. Those objectives consist of: ensuring the continuity of critical functions; 
evading negative effects on the financial system by preventing contagion and preserve 
market discipline; minimizing the use of public funds; protecting covered depositors 
and investors and lastly defending client funds and assets. These objectives should be 
accomplished taking into account the minimization of costs and avoid destruction of 
value, except when it conflicts with objectives. The importance of the different 
objectives is weighted the same, with none taking precedence above the others. 
The resolution measures that can be used in interventions are dependent on the 
circumstances and should be planed for specific institutions. Major tools at the disposal 
of the authorities consist in the selling of parts of the bank to private sector without the 
need for shareholder approval or the creation of temporary institutions (labelled as 
“bridge banks”) to continue some functions of the institution under resolution process. 
Some other measures consist in the separation of toxic assets and liabilities from the 
institution creating “good” and “bad” banks dichotomy or finally “bail-in” creditors, 
reducing liabilities or turning debt into equity. These instruments can be applied in 
conjunction and authorities are able to use other measures if needed. Is important to 
emphasize that all the measures are only possible after the shareholders and creditors 
bear losses of 8% of the institution liabilities but still, under very specific conditions, 
the losses can be supported by the tax payers and not fully by the private creditors 
(European Parliament and Council 2014a).  
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Authorities have several options when committed to intervene, Hoggarth et al 
(2003) sort the strategies between two axes, the first is whether the bank should be 
closed or not and the second is the degree of involvement of the authorities. The two 
extremes in the first axis are the injection of capital to keep the bank open and the 
opposite strategy the closing of the bank with assets sold. According to the same authors 
the level of involvement of the authorities can vary between supporting private sector 
interventions or nationalisation by the government. 








Source: Hoggarth et al (2003) 
According to the Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial 
Institutions from the Financial Stability Board (2011) and Regulation (EU) No. 
806/2014 (European Parliament and Council 2014a) the resolution authorities should 
pursue financial stability and guarantee continuity of vital financial services. Also 
authorities should, when possible, protect covered depositors, client assets and public 
funds. The costs of resolutions should be kept to a minimum and unnecessary loss of 
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Finally authorities have to contemplate the impact of the resolution in the financial 
stability in other jurisdictions. 
Some other principles can be added to the basis for bank resolution measures 
including efficiency and speed of the process that help keep costs at a minimum (Beck 
2003 and Goodhart 2005) or some flexibility of actions used in intervention processes 
(Fonteyne et al. 2010).  
The importance of transparency towards the financial sector and cost-
effectiveness is noted by several authors (for example Nier and Baumann 2006 or 
Hakenes and Schnabel 2010), were greater disclosure tend to moderate the negative 
effects of banking resolutions.  
Fonteyne et al. (2010) goes further and consider the importance of transparency 
not just from a fiscal and financial viewpoint but as a political issue. The reason given is 
the weight of the political cost in the decision making process concerning authorities 
intervention. According to the authors the indispensable aspects of cost effectiveness 
should consist in of three traits such as no loss for insured depositors, minimum 
negative effect on the economy and low impact on government budget.  
Cost effective banking resolutions act as a defence against another important 
aspect of banking resolution, moral hazard problems. Moral hazard occurs when the 
shareholders and managers feel that the authorities will support most of the banks 
causing the threat of bankruptcy to be ignored, encouraging the high-risk high-reward 
behaviour from the banks (Čihák and Nier 2009). 
By comparing past crisis with the recent financial crisis Laeven and Valencia 
(2010) found some differences particularly the most affected countries were advanced 
economies and resolution policies were implemented faster, which can be explained by 
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the robust institutions present in the developed countries that were involved. Authorities 
also used a wider diversity of measures and in larger scale and there is a higher cost of 
recent crisis in terms of GDP and bigger impact on public debt but a lower fiscal cost. 
 
2.2. Systemic Risk 
The dire implications of a systemic banking crisis are felt not only on the 
financial sector but on the economy as a whole, with banking system instability causing 
high cost in the economy. This makes systemic risk one of the most important aspects 
for the authorities to consider in regard to Banking Resolution. 
Costs are divided in two types of losses, the fiscal costs and output costs as costs 
endured by the economy. The costs of a banking crisis in terms of output range from 
15% to 25% of annual GDP in average (Hoggarth et al. (2002), Laeven and Valencia 
(2010)).  
Table I. Costs of Banking Crises from 1970 to 2009 
 Direct Fiscal Cost Increase in Public Debt Output Losses 
 Median (% of GDP) 
Old Crises (1970-2006) 10.0 16.3 19.5 
New crises (2007-2009) 4.9 23.9 24.5 
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2010) 
Laeven and Valencia (2010) compared the costs of banking crises in three 
vectors: the direct fiscal costs, the output costs and the increase in public debt. 
Comparing the increase of public debt relative to the GDP for the recent crises with the 
past information the authors found that the values are higher now by almost 8% of 
GDP. The output losses also increase 5% of GDP in comparison to older crises values. 
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In contrast by comparing the data related to fiscal costs the conclusions are that these 
costs are significantly lower, reaching half of the costs recorded for previous crises.  
The authors highlighted some reasons for the fiscal cost reduction between the 
new and old crises such as the specificity that several highly developed countries with 
large financial institutions were affected by the crisis urging involvement from the 
authorities. The interventions were quicker and much earlier in recent crises 
contributing to lower fiscal expenses of recapitalizations, also there were a wide variety 
of procedures that indirectly supported the financial system, for instance government 
guarantees. On the other hand the disadvantages of using indirect measures to support 
the financial sector are evident in the increase of public debt and interconnected budget 
concerns that elucidate the reason for higher output losses. 
Hoggarth et al. (2002), refer that is difficult to separate costs of banking crisis 
and recessions since the relations between them are not clear, is difficult to find if the 
output costs are caused by banking crisis or that recession caused  the banking crisis in 
the first place. In any case the authors concluded that the costs are intensified during a 
banking crisis whether banking crises are created by recession or it is the other way 
around.    
Systemic risk is as a rule connected to the banking and currency crisis. There are 
several definitions of systemic risk, the European Central Bank (2010) characterize it as 
a widespread risk in the financial networks , Kaufman (2000) identifies systemic risk as 
the probability of collapse of the entire system caused by the failure of individual 
fractions. The interdependences between different banks emphasize this threat for the 
financial system. 
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Other designations focus on additional aspects such as externalities (Group of 
Ten 2001) and impact on the economy (Financial Stability Board 2009) or imbalances 
in capital flows (Caballero 2010). 
 
2.3. Consumer Protection 
 The investors fear of losing their deposits origins a widespread panic and a “run 
to the banks” phenomenon. The protection of clients is then a major piece concerning 
Banking Resolution because the suspicion of institutions and the financial system cause 
liquidity concerns. 
 Legislation regarding deposit-guarantee has started in the European Union with 
Directive 94/19/EC (European Parliament and Council of Europe 1994) requiring that 
each depositor must have its aggregated deposits covered in 20,000 € to at least 90% of 
deposit value. In March of 2009 Directive 2009/14/EC (European Parliament and 
Council of Europe 2009) revises the previous Directive to 50,000 € in order to better 
hold depositors trust, and the raises the coverage in 2010 to 100,000 €. This increase 
was motivated by disparity in coverage rates in EU countries that could cause depositors 
to flee lower coverage countries for others with higher coverage rate.  
Ireland influenced the revision of Directive 94/19/EC by giving unlimited 
coverage not just to deposits but also to senior unsecured certificates of deposit, senior 
unsecured commercial paper and senior unsecured bonds and notes (credit institution 
Eligible Liabilities Guarantee scheme 2009). Irish minister of finance announced in a 
press conference that no to new liabilities receive this guarantee starting 28 March 2013 
(Department of Finance 2013). 
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Depositors guarantee in Iceland is based on the EU Directive 94/19/EC and 
guarantees deposits for at least 20,887 €, it is managed by the Depositors’ and Investors 
Guarantee Fund (Tryggingarsjóður innstæðueigenda og fjárfesta). 
A report made by Oxera Consulting (2007) for the EU reached the conclusion 
that guarantees should not apply to large firms because these firms are better equipped 
to evaluate risk and have more options to attenuate that risk, that way the guarantees are 
used in costumers that most need them. A press release by the Council of the European 
Union (2013) also reaffirms the priority to depositors and micro, small and medium size 
enterprises in accessing resolution funds. 
There is some criticism to deposit guarantees because of increased risk taking by 
the banks and subsequently higher instability (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2002), 
creating a moral hazard. There is also opposing argument made by Gropp and Vesala 
(2004) that previous conclusions may be affected by data from developing countries 
that do not necessarily apply to countries with a more credible authorities and the 
exclusion of certain creditors from guarantees reduce the moral hazard.   
 
2.4. Main Aspects of Resolution Processes 
According to the literature the basis for interventions are numerous but the main 
motives are the continuity of the institution; no solutions available by private means and 
that those resolutions guarantee financial stability (European Parliament and Council 
2014a). If the intervention is needed it should be endorsed to retail and investment 
institutions.  
 Authorities abide by the protection of covered depositors, costumers assets and 
public funds. On a secondary level the costs of resolution should be reduced, authorities 





BANKING RESOLUTION. BETWEEN THE SYSTEMIC 
RISK AND THE CONSUMER PROTECTION 
should minimize loss of assets value and the impact on other countries should be 
considered (Financial Stability Board 2011). Other important factors are the speed of 
the process (Goodhart 2005 and Beck 2003), flexibility of actions (Fonteyne et al. 
2010), transparency, depth of intervention and degree of socialisation of burdens 
(Honohan 2012). 
 The major instruments at the disposal of the authorities are capital injection to 
keep the stability of both the institution and the banking system; the liquidation of 
portion of the bank under court order; creation of “bridge banks” to facilitate the process 
of resolution; split the institution according to assets and liabilities viability and lastly to 
bail-in creditors in order to restore capitalisation (European Parliament and Council 
2014a).  
 
3. Banking Crises  
 The banking crises analysis focused on Iceland and Ireland cases, with a 
summary of the banking crisis itself, the international assistance and the resolution 
measures for each country. 
3.1. Iceland 
 The first country studied was Iceland that experienced singular incidents 
regarding consumer protection. 
3.1.1. Icelandic Banking Crisis 
 The damage done to Iceland’s banking system and the economy as a whole 
caused by the financial crisis is tremendous. Iceland had GDP growth of over 6% on 
average in from 2004 to 2007 but after 2008 Iceland experienced severe recession, with 
a drop in GDP of 6.6% in 2009 and for a second time in 2010 with a drop of 4.1%. 
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Danielsson (2009) called the Iceland financial crisis the “deepest and most rapid 
financial crisis recorded in peace time”. 
 The financial crisis in Iceland is considered to be one of the harshest financial 
crises since 1970 (Laeven and Valencia, 2013). It is considered the third costliest in 
terms of fiscal cost (44% of GDP) and the seventh that most increased public debt (72% 
of GDP).  
Mid-2007 was the beginning of the end for Iceland’s financial sector, Credit 
Default Swap spreads fast climb were a warning sign that investor were worried. The 
Iceland banking system suffered a huge blow with the failure of the three major banks 
(Glitnir, Kaupthing and Landsbanki) in less than two weeks. The board of directors of 
Landsbanki was dismissed on the 7 October and on the same day authorities took 
control of Glitnir in addition on the next day Kaupthing is nationalised.  In relation to 
the total banking assets of the country 90% of Iceland’s banking institutions required 
government assistance over the period between 2007 and 2009, making Iceland the 
country with the highest value of bank assets intervened in the world for this specific 
period. Iceland is also the country that between 2007 and 2009 incurred in highest fiscal 
cost, 13% of GDP (Laeven and Valencia (2010)). 
 Glitnir, Kaupthing and Landsbanki had immense growth from the beginning of 
the 21
st
 century until the collapse of Lehman Brothers, increasing their consolidated 
assets from 100% of Iceland GDP in 2004 to close to 900% in the end of 2007 (OECD 
2009). The majority of these banks assets were in foreign branches and subsidiaries, 
making them very susceptible to international threats. Also the banks growth was 
supported by the wholesale market, causing the financial crisis to have a stronger impact 





BANKING RESOLUTION. BETWEEN THE SYSTEMIC 
RISK AND THE CONSUMER PROTECTION 
on them mostly from increased risk of default of the clients (International Monetary 
Fund 2008). 
 
3.1.2. Icesave Crisis 
Landsbanki had a deposit plan named Icesave especially for clients from the 
United Kingdom and Netherlands that was involved in an international disagreement. 
The nationalisation of the main banks of Iceland caused a general “run to the banks”, 
which caused the shortages of funds of the Depositors’ and Investors’ Guarantee Fund 
of Iceland (Jackson 2010). Also the government of Iceland proceeded to guarantee all 
depositors funds in Iceland but not the deposits of present in branches and subsidiaries 
on foreign countries (Centonze 2011). 
 In retaliation the United Kingdom froze the assets of Landsbanki and several 
other assets related to the bank but owned by the government of Iceland (Barker et al. 
(2008)). The governments of the United Kingdom and Netherlands return the funds to 
Icesave depositors in the respective countries, supporting the minimum deposit 
expenses with the national guarantee scheme and the values remaining were paid by the 
government (Centonze 2011).  
On the 6 March 2010 a referendum was called by the President of Iceland in 
order to decide if the authorities should reimburse the governments of the United 
Kingdom and Netherlands of the minimum deposit expenses guarantee (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2010a). This reimbursement was rejected in public consultation with the 
vast majority of voters choosing not to reimburse (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010b). 
A second referendum was held again in 2011after the President of Iceland decision not 
the sign legislation for the compensation of the governments of the United Kingdom 
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and the Netherlands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011a). This referendum was also 
rejected and the reimbursing was disallowed (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011b). The 
President of Iceland justified his refusal to sign the legislation with petition signed by a 
considerable amount of Icelandic citizens and the ultimate purpose to give the voters 
options and responsibility (Declaration by the President of Iceland 2010). 
EFTA (European Free Trade Association) Surveillance Authority applied for the 
EFTA Court on 15 December 20011the basis that Iceland authorities had not complied 
with the Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and the Council (1994). On 28
 
January 2013 the Court decided to clear Icelandic authorities of all claims (Case E-
16/11, EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland 2013). 
 
3.1.3. International Monetary Fund Assistance 
 The strict measures brought by the International Monetary Fund made the 
Iceland’s authorities consider the assistance as a last resort measure. The evolution of 
the banking sector crisis and economic recession confirmed the need for an agreement 
between Icelandic authorities and the International Monetary Fund.  The agreement was 
approved on 19
 
November 2008 in the form of a Stand-By Arrangement for a period 
two year (International Monetary Fund 2008c) in addition to a loan of US$2.5 billion 
granted by Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark. The Stand-By Arrangement of 
US$2.1 billion with US$827 million made available straight away and with the rest 
divided by eight instalments of US$155 million dependent on quarterly reviews. 
 The main objectives of Icelandic and International Monetary Fund program was 
to prevent the depreciation of the Icelandic króna, to support the strategy for bank 
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restructuring and to promote medium-term fiscal sustainability (International Monetary 
Fund 2008b). 
 Exchange rate stabilization was an immediate priority and was tackled by raising 
the interest rate, lowering króna volatility and there were temporarily restrictions on 
capital outflows (International Monetary Fund 2008b). 
 Fiscal policies objectives were to emphasize Iceland’s debt sustainability. No 
additional commitments were expected by the authorities on fiscal matters before 2010 
(International Monetary Fund 2008b). Iceland fiscal deficit was reduced dramatically 
from 2010 forward, going from a 9.7% of GDP deficit in 2010 to 1.7% of GDP deficit 
in 2013. Government debt was still high in 2012, reaching 96.4% of GDP according to 
Eurostat. 
 The strategy for restructuring the banking sector had two main intentions 
maximize asset recovery as transparently as possible and to fulfil the legal obligations 
toward depositors and creditors. A review of the banking sector regulatory framework 
and supervisory guidelines was needed in order to protect the financial sector from 
further financial crises (International Monetary Fund 2008b). 
  
3.1.4. Resolution Process 
 The financial crisis in Iceland overwhelmed the banking system which required 
extreme measures by the Icelandic authorities. The explanation given by the authorities 
for the need of intervention caused the banking sector crisis was based on the defence of 
the sustained operations of the sector and the downsizing of the banking sector to a 
more standard level considering similar economies. The authorities took control of six 
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different financial institutions Glitnir, Kaupthing, Landsbanki, Straumur-Burdarasand, 
SPRON and Sparisjódabankinn, all in 2008 (Laeven and Valencia 2013).  
 The three major banks were authorities intervened (Glitnir, Kaupthing and 
Landsbanki) were separated into a “new bank” and an “old bank” (Centonze 2011). The 
new banks included the operations supported by Icelandic depositors, the assets and a 
large part of liabilities while the old banks were composed of the operations present in 
the bank’s foreign branches and subsidiaries, supported through bonds and deposits 
from foreign, and also the financial derivatives (International Monetary Fund 2008b). 
From Glitnir was created Íslandsbanki, first called Nýi Glitnir or New Glitnir. The bank 
was owned by the creditors of the old Glitnir by 95% of equity and the residual equity 
owned by the government of Iceland (Íslandsbanki Consolidated Financial Statements 
2008). New Kaupthing become Arion Banki and creditors from the old Kaupthing hold 
87% of equity (New Kaupthing Bank Consolidated Fiancial Statements 2008). 
Landsbanki was converted to Landsbankinn and was owned by the Icelandic State 
Financial Investments in 81.3% and the remaining 18.67% were owned by the creditors 
of the old Landsbanki (Landsbankinn Consolidated Financial Statements 2010). 
 A committee constituted of representatives of the Prime Minister Office, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce, the Financial Supervisory Authority 
and the Central Bank of Iceland with an expert in banking as the chairman organize and 
coordinated the procedures for the banking sector reorganization. This committee had 
the purpose of resolve intervened banks and to maximize asset recovery value 
(International Monetary Fund 2008b). 
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 In order to make sure the creditor rights are guaranteed and that the 
measurement of the assets in old and new banks is correct international auditors were 
hired (International Monetary Fund 2008b). 
 Authorities wanted to ensure that treatment of depositors and creditors in the 
resolution process was fair, equitable and non-discriminatory. Independent auditors 
were hired to value assets moved from old to new banks to guarantee fair payment for 
those assets. Insured depositors in Iceland were under the Depositors’ and Investors 
Guarantee Fund (Tryggingarsjóður innstæðueigenda og fjárfesta) and were fully 
guaranteed by the government. 
 The Depositors’ and investors’ guarantee Fund is constituted by the compulsive 
contributions of commercial and savings banks. It is supervised by the Financial 
Supervisory Authority (FME) and is a private institution since 2000. 
 Insolvency laws were altered in order to better manage banking resolution. One 
example is the amendment in 2011 on the Bankruptcy Act that ensured a restructuring 
or insolvency process was needed in order to make distributions to the creditors when 
previously simply a liquidation process was sufficient to allocate creditor claims. 
 
3.2. Ireland 
 Ireland was the second country to be studied, it is remarkable for the early 
blanket guarantee and the strain on the public budget.  
3.2.1. Irish Banking Crisis 
 The global financial crisis heavily affected Ireland and it was considered 
systemic in 2009 (Laeven and Valencia, 2013). The impact was also felt on economic 
growth, in 2007 GDP growth was almost 5% but after the crisis GDP plummet more 
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than 7% in 2010. Ireland was the first country in the Eurozone to fall into recession in 
the middle of 2007. 
 Laeven and Valencia (2013) ranked Irish banking crisis as one of the most 
severe by output loss since the 1970 totalling 105% of GDP. The Irish crisis is also 
seventh most expensive crisis in terms of fiscal costs (41% of GDP) and contributed to a 
massive increase in public debt (73% of GDP). 
 The great dependence of the housing market is one of the causes for the global 
financial crisis vast impact in the Irish economy. The banks had an increment in housing 
sector related assets motivated by apparently eternal lower interest rates, higher property 
prices and increasing household income. The public finances were also reliant on 
housing sector; in 2006 almost 20% of tax revenues came from property related taxes 
(including VAT, stamp duty and capital gains tax) (European Commission 2011). 
 The foreign exposure to Irish banks was also a concern for the European 
authorities. The Bank for International Settlements (2010) estimated that countries in 
the Eurozone and the United Kingdom were exposed to more than US$110 billion to 
Irish banks and more than US$550 billion of total exposure to Ireland assets. The 
countries more exposed to Irish banks were Germany with an exposure of US$47.5 
billion, United Kingdom with US$31.1 billion and France with US$18.9 billion. 
With the failure of Lehman Brothers several difficulties arise for the Irish 
banking sector. The major problem was the reduced short-term liquidity of banking 
institutions (Honohan 2012). Liquidity problems occurred from the freeze of 
interbanking short-term loans that were very important for Irish banks, in addition there 
were substantial deposits taken from institutions. 
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Market turmoil on the banking sector required the Irish authorities to intervene 
on 29 September 2008 by granting a two year guarantee (Governor of the Central Bank 
2010). On this date the Ministry of Finance guaranteed all deposits (retail, corporate and 
interbank), covered bond, senior debt and dated subordinated debt for the banks that 
evidence liquidity concerns (Allied Irish Banks (AIB), Bank of Ireland, Anglo Irish 
Bank, Irish Life and Permanent, Irish Nationwide Building Society and EBS)  as well as 
the respective subsidiaries (European Commission 2008). 
Irish authorities also created the Eligible Liabilities Guarantee Scheme for the 
credit institutions on 9 December 2009. This scheme backed liabilities of systemically 
important institutions and was review at six months intervals. Liabilities guaranteed 
include deposits and senior unsecured debt (House of Oireachtas 2009). 
Despite the authorities focus on the liquidity problems later there were also 
concerned with solvency problems in the banking sector (Honohan 2012). In Ireland 
these problems were caused by a decline of loans given to property deals, reduced price 
of properties, recession and difficulty to assess the risk related to property deals 
(Honohan 2009). The reduced value of assets of the institutions in conjunction with the 
preservation of the values of the liabilities provoked solvency concerns.   
 Ireland authorities reacted to the concerns evident on Irish banks and decided to 
resort to injection of capital for the largest Irish banks; AIB, Anglo Irish Bank, Irish 
National Building Society, EBS and Bank of Ireland (Laeven and Valencia 2013). For 
the purpose of managing the state intervention on the banking sector the government 
created the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA). For the period between 
February 2009 and December 2010 approximately €46 billion were injected on Irish 
banks, the equivalent of 29% of Ireland’s GDP (European Commission 2010). 
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3.2.2. External Financial Assistance 
 Several events during 2010 forced the Irish authorities to request International 
assistance. There were doubts on the possibility of default by Irish state bonds raising 
the yields to extremely high values, causing investors to take their funds from Irish 
banks. The need for fiscal correction in 2011, the negative growth of GDP and the 
pressure on public finances were the incentives that ignited the suspicions of financial 
markets (European Commission 2011, International Monetary Fund 2010a).  
 On 21 November 2010 Irish authorities apply for assistance from the European 
Union and the International Monetary Fund. A total of €85 billion were approved by the 
European Commission, European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
combined. The conditions for the loan were agreed on 28 November 2010 and required 
policies to be implemented by the Irish authorities (European Commission 2011).  
 The main intentions for the assistance programme were to restore confidence 
both on the banking sector and on sovereign debt of Ireland. The methods for re-
establish that confidence were based on four pillars: financial sector restructuring; 
return fiscal viability; economic growth and support by the assistance programme 
(European Commission 2011). 
In order to achieve fiscal consolidation the Irish authorities promoted a 
correction totalling 9% of GDP between 2011 and 2014. The measures focused on the 
reduction of expenditures notably decrease of public service numbers, correction of 
pensions and savings on public transfers. An increment of revenues was supported by 
raise of income tax (International Monetary Fund 2010a). 
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The restoration of economic growth was based on legislation that encourages 
trade and competition, adjust the electricity and gas prices and to correct the labour 
market, reducing unemployment. 
The assistance programme was financed by the IMF on €22.5 billion, by the 
European Financial Stability Mechanism/European Financial Stability Facility on €45 
billion and also an Irish part from the National Pension Reserve Fund that amount to 
€17 billion. The programme was review quarterly on a series of performance measures 
and on the implementation of structural reforms (International Monetary Fund 2010a). 
The reform of the financial sector involve downsizing of banking sector and the 
restructuring of institutions. To promote this reform the banks were required to deliver 
plans in order to reduce their leverage (International Monetary Fund 2010a). 
 
3.2.3. Resolution Process 
 Irish authorities acted upon the devastated banking system and created the 
NAMA with the sole purpose of managing the assets of restructured banks. The 
procedures needed to reignite the viability for the banking sector were mainly the 
substantial downsizing and deleverage processes. Capital injections were needed to 
support these processes, justifying the need for external assistance. For the stability of 
the system the authorities also created specific resolution legislation (International 
Monetary Fund 2010a). 
 The authorities’ structure for dealing with resolution processes before the crisis 
did not include procedures that are considered standard at the moment. Special 
legislation was created in order to provide specific measures to address resolution 
processes effectively and efficiently (Čihák and Nier 2012). The legislation granted the 
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Central Bank powers to create bridge banks; a resolution fund was created; proceed to 
transfer assets and liabilities from one institution to another; appoint special 
management for institutions under intervention; manage liquidation of institutions and 
require recovery and resolution plans from banks (House of Oireachtas 2011). 
 The restructuring process of the banking sector had a cost further than 40% of 
GDP to Irish authorities. Nationalization procedures were needed on major Irish 
institutions: Anglo Irish Bank in 2009; EBS, Irish Nationwide and AIB in 2010 and 
more recently Irish Life and Permanent in 2011 (Laeven and Valencia 2013). 
 Authorities establish a plan for the restructuring of the banking sector constituted 
of several components. Initially banks had to clear all their non-core assets, by 
transferring the property loans to NAMA or by securitise or sell non-performing assets 
(International Monetary Fund 2010a). 
 On December 2008 the Irish government announced an injection of €2 billion 
each on AIB and Bank of Ireland. An injection of €1.5 billion was schedule for Anglo 
Irish Bank but instead it was nationalised on January 2009 following capital outflows. 
Caused by this nationalisation conditions worsened for AIB and Bank of Ireland and the 
value received was in fact €3.5 billion (Honohan 2012). With the realization that the 
losses on property loans were higher than expected even the nationalised Anglo Irish 
Bank obtained €4 billion in capital in June 2009. 
The reason for creation of the NAMA was put into effect with the purchase of 
property loans in an attempt to reduced losses for Irish banks. Still the projected losses 
were extremely high, almost €31 billion, and the fact that most of the value had to be 
supplied by the authorities caused the Irish authorities to request external assistance 
from the International Monetary Fund and the European Union (Honohan 2012). 
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 Anglo Irish Bank need for successive adjustments to meet capital requirements, 
totalling €25.3 billion, denoted a complex problem for the authorities. In September 
2010 the authorities decided that the best solution was to split the bank into two parts; 
the Funding Bank with the deposits, Central Bank capital and assets guarantee and a 
Recovery Bank holding the remaining assets and liabilities (Honohan 2012). Authorities 
merged Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide on July 2011 and formed Irish Banking 
Resolution Corporation. On February 2013 the government gave the order to liquidate 
this institution (House of Oireachtas 2013). 
 As a part of the reorganization of the Irish banking system EBS was acquired by 
AIB in July 2011 (EBS 2011). Ireland Central Bank required further €14.8 in capital 
requirements from the two institutions, €13.3 for AIB and €1.5 for EBS. In order for the 
institutions to meet the necessary capital requirement the Irish authorities contributed 
with €6.1 billion and an additional contingent capital notes values €1.6 billion. The Irish 
State owns, through the National Pension Reserve Fund, 99.8% of equity from the 
conjoined institutions (AIB Annual Financial Report 2012). 
 Bank of Ireland repaid the€6 billion regarding the €4.8 billion invested by the 
Irish authorities in 2013. The Irish State holds 14% equity of the institution (Bank of 
Ireland Group Annual Report 2013). 
 Concerning Irish Life and Permanent the authorities nationalised the institution 
by injecting €2.7 billion, controlling 99.2% equity. In April 2012 the Irish authorities 
took signed a share purchase agreement paying €1.3 billion for 100% of Irish Life 
Group (Irish Life and Permanent Group Annual Report 2011). The Irish Life Group was 
sold on February 2013 to Great-West Lifeco for €1.3 billion (Great-West Lifeco Inc. 
Annual report 2013). To the remaining part of the institution authorities injected €2.7 
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billion in capital and changed the name to Permanent tsb (Permanent tsb Group Annual 
Report 2012). 
 Honohan (2012) highlighted the instruments used by the Irish authorities for the 
processes of banking resolution. The initial measures consisted of injection of cash on 
the intuitions under pressure (AIB, Bank of Ireland and Irish Life and Permanent) and 
promissory notes to banks later liquidated (Irish Banking Resolution Corporation 
constituted by Anglo Irish and Irish Nationwide).  
 Other measures included the split of institutions into “good” and “bad” banks 
(Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Life and Permanent) with the Irish Life Group sale to a 
private company. Extensive guarantees were also offered (Eligible Liabilities Guarantee 
2009). 
 As final remarks Honohan (2012) evaluated the restructuring in the banking 
sector in three dimensions: Transparency, depth and socialisation. The resolution 
process was considered transparent but the expected losses were taken as a definitive 
value, which later caused several adjustments for capital requirements. On terms of 
depth the capital requirements were proved to be insufficient and after 2010 the 
recapitalisation goals were revised. The early choice for a blanket guarantee was 
criticised because it included institution severely affected by the losses on problem 
loans, in addition the International Monetary Fund and European Union did not allowed 
losses to reach unguaranteed senior bondholders making the socialisation of losses 
seemed excessive. 
 The severe disadvantage of unreliable and inaccurate information regarding 
losses from problematic loans was a major problem that became more evident with the 
choice to grant a blanket guarantee early on. The combination of this factors put 
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tremendous pressure on Irelands’ finances, making over-capitalisation of institutions not 
possible.  
 The existence of the blanket guarantee also required the authorities to mind 
certain resolution measures in order to not incur on excessive expenses, since there 
could be deposit runs that were covered by that guarantee. The legislation required for 
proper resolution measures was only present after the beginning of the crisis, making 
the authorities ability to deal with the problems less effective. In any case some form of 
guarantee was to be expected as an imposition from the International Monetary Fund 
and European Union. 
 
4. Method for Analysis 
 In order to provide an analysis to resolution processes it was needed to select 
some relevant aspects that should be focused. The components of the analysis were 
divided into three parts the achievement of resolution objectives, conditions for 
intervention met and finally tools used. 
The main information source regarding resolution analysis constituent was the 
European Union legislation, notably Regulation No. 806/2014 and Directive 
2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and the Council. 
The analysis will investigate whether the following two main resolution 
objectives were achieved: maintenance of financial stability and protection of covered 
consumers (depositors and investors). The cost of procedure to public funds will also be 
examined.  
This analysis will examine if the following three conditions are observed: the 
institution is on the verge of collapse; the collapse cannot be prevented by private sector 
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measures and that the normal liquidation process of the institution clash with the 
resolution objectives. 
For the purpose of this analysis the resolution tools considered are divided in 
four main groups: the sale of business; asset separation; bail-in tool and recapitalisation 
supported by the sate. For clarification reasons the tools will be explained in accordance 
to European Parliament and Council (2014a). The sale of business consists in the sale of 
an assets or liability belonging to the institution to another party. The asset separation 
process is the transfer of assets and liabilities from an institution to an entity responsible 
for the management, in this analysis bridge institutions are also considered. The bail-in 
tool consists in the conversion to equity, or reduction of the principal amount, of debt 
instruments transferred to bridge institution (to grant capital) or involved in sale of 
business or asset separation processes. The recapitalisation supported by the state is 
considered the last resort because it involves using public funds, it can also be called 
bail-out. 
  
5. Resolution Analysis 
 The analysis was centred on the resolution objectives, conditions for intervention 
met and resolution tools. 
5.1. Resolution Conditions 
 The circumstances were a institution is considered on the verge of collapse are 
that in the near future the liabilities are greater than the assets, the institution is unable 
to support debts or other liabilities and for preserving financial stability a public sustain 
is needed. Iceland’s Financial Supervisory Authority (2009) considered the banks 
intervened to be failing and hold responsible the risk eagerness of the institutions. 
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Ireland’s authorities were forced to intervene since the projected losses on property 
were substantial (Honohan 2012). 
 The reasons for not finding an alternative private measure or that normal 
insolvency processes were not considered are mostly related to the size of the 
institutions affected, both relative to the country and total assets. Iceland’s three major 
banks before the crisis accounted for 85% of the banking system and their total assets 
were about eight times the size of the country’s GDP (Centonze 2011). In the case of 
Ireland the banking sector assets amount to 900% of GDP and the five largest banks 
compose about 55% of total assets (European Central Bank 2013). 
Table II. Iceland and Ireland resolution conditions met 
 
Iceland Ireland 
   
Verge of Collapse Yes Yes 
Alternative Private Measures not viable Yes Yes 
Normal Insolvency not viable Yes Yes 
Source: Author 
5.2. Resolution Tools 
 The analysis for the resolution tools will be split into four groups the sale of 
business, asset separation, bail-in tool and state recapitalisation. 
 The sale of institutions is very straightforward in terms of function, consists in 
the sale of part of an organization to private buyers (European Parliament and Council 
2014). The sale of institutions was used by the authorities of Iceland in October 2008 
with the sale of the Norwegian subsidiary of Glitnir bank, called Glitnir ASA, to 
SpareBank 1 an Alliance of Norwegian savings banks (BN Bank ASA Annual Report 
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2011). Irish Life Group was sold by Irish authorities to Great-West Lifeco, a Canadian 
firm, in February 2013 (Great-West Lifeco Inc. Annual report 2013). 
 The asset separation instrument was heavily used by the authorities of both 
countries. For the analysis the creation of bridge institutions is also considered. In 
Iceland all the three major banks were all separated into old and new banks and the 
majority of the assets and liabilities were transferred to the new banks (Centonze 2011, 
International Monetary Fund 2008b). Irish authorities determined the split of the Anglo 
Irish Bank and posterior creation of a bridge institution formed by Anglo Irish Bank and 
Irish Nationwide (Honohan 2012). Irish Life and Permanent was also separated and one 
fraction named Irish Life Group was sold to Great-West Lifeco (Irish Life and 
Permanent Group Annual Report 2011). 
 The bail-in instruments involve converting debt into equity for institutions under 
resolution. In Iceland the allocation of the assets to the new banks also converted 
creditors into shareholders of these new banks. These creditors of the old banks were a 
majority in Íslandsbanki and Arion Banki and owned almost 19% in Landsbankinn. 
Perhaps caused by the possibility of decreasing confidence in the financial system and 
the debt holders this measure was not widely used in Ireland. Senior bondholders in 
Ireland were included in the state guarantee and were not called to contribute (Honohan 
2012). 
 According to European Parliament and the Council (2014a) legislation state 
recapitalizations should be considered only after significant losses to the creditors. 
Iceland’s decision to transfer most of the assets to new banks after separating the 
domestic operations from the foreign ones in the three main banks manages to contain 
the potential losses making the recapitalisations relatively low (International Monetary 
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Fund 2008b). On the contrary Honohan (2012) noted that in Ireland the authorities had 
to injected capital into major institutions for impossibility to reach recapitalization 
requirements. 
Table III. Iceland and Ireland resolution tools used and institutions 
 
Iceland Ireland 
Sale of Business Glitnir ASA (Glitnir bank 
subsidiary) 
Irish Life Group (Irish Life and 
Permanent subsidiary) 
Asset Separation Glitnir; Kaupthing and 
Landsbanki 
Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Life 
and Permanent 
Bail-in Íslandsbanki; Arion Banki and  
Landsbankinn 
Senior Bondholders not affected 
in any institution 
State 
Recapitalization 
Íslandsbanki; Arion Banki and  
Landsbankinn (Lower than in 
Ireland) 
AIB; Bank of Ireland; Irish Life 
and Permanent; Anglo Irish and 
Irish Nationwide 
Source: Author 
5.3. Resolution Objectives 
 The resolution objective is one of the most important aspects in the analysis of 
the intervention process. It is related with the resolution tools, the different instruments 
use identify the priorities of the authorities. The bail-in tool is used to impose losses on 
the bondholders preserving public funds for diverse purposes, such as guarantee 
deposits. 
 For the analysis of financial stability we can consider the capital adequacy ratio, 
the liquidity ratio and the credit rating (Gadanecz and Jayaram 2009). Iceland 
accomplished better results in those two ratios compared to the periods before 
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intervention (International Monetary Fund 2013). Regarding Ireland Moody’s raise the 
sovereign credit rating to Baa1 in October 2014 and Fitch maintain BBB+ stable 
outlook rating (Department of Finance 2014). 
 Considering the protection of costumers the countries studied illustrate two 
different realities. In Ireland authorities granted a guarantee that included all deposits, 
covered bonds and senior debt in 2008 (European Commission 2008) that fully 
protected consumers. On the other hand in Iceland the authorities had a guarantee for 
the depositors in the country but not the deposits in foreign countries, causing the 
authorities of those foreign countries to intervene and protect those depositors 
(Centonze 2011). 




Financial Stability Yes Yes 
Protect Covered Consumers Only depositors from Iceland Yes 
Source: Author 
6. Conclusion 
 With the recent financial crisis and the subsequent banking crisis the banking 
resolution processes gained and higher relevance. We decided to analyse the situation in 
Iceland and Ireland in the light of recent European legislation. The analysis focused on 
the existing conditions before the resolution, the instrument applied in the resolution 
process and the objectives accomplished. 
 The situation on both countries analysed was very similar in terms or conditions 
present before the authorities intervention. Ireland and Iceland authorities were forced to 
intervene on the greater part of their respective banking sector on the concern of 
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financial instability. The systemic risk was high and alternatives, whether private or 
insolvency process, were considered not viable motivated on the sheer size of the 
troubled institutions’ assets. 
 Regarding instruments used we can clearly acknowledge some differences 
between the interventions of the two countries. Icelandic authorities minimized state 
recapitalizations and prioritize bail-in measures on the institutions intervened. On the 
contrary in Ireland the bail-in tool did not affect the senior bondholders of any 
institution and recapitalizations were more common than in Iceland. It should be noted 
that both countries the fiscal costs and public debt increase were tremendous and 
required international assistance. 
 The objectives considered were the financial stability maintenance and the 
protection of consumers. Financial stability was achieved after the resolution measures 
in both countries and was one of the main motivations for intervention. Regarding 
protection of consumers the depositor’s protection was the focal point, with guarantees 
in Ireland forcing the European Union to update deposit guarantees values. Irish 
guarantee did not just included depositors but also some bond holders. Iceland’s 
situation is more complex with the full value of the guarantee used on Icelandic 
depositors and foreign depositors on subsidiaries could not retrieve their deposits. We 
can conclude that Icelandic authorities valued financial stability higher than the 
depositors of branches and subsidiaries. 
 For future research additional objectives can be considered such as the 
minimisation of losses of institutions’ assets, swiftness of the process or the 
transparency. The impact of resolution processes on other countries is also effect that 
should be considered.  
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Appendix 
Figure 2. Iceland GDP growth 2004-2013 
Source: World Bank national accounts data 
 
Table V. Fiscal costs of crisis on 2008 for Iceland and Ireland 
 
Fiscal Cost (% of GDP) 
Iceland 44 
Ireland 41 
Source: Laeven and Valencia 2013 
  
Table VI. Increase in public debt on 2008 for Iceland and Ireland 
 
Increase in public debt (% of GDP) 
Iceland 72 
Ireland 73 
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2013) 
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 




        .  Deposit-taking institutions 79.7 
         .  Investment Banks 6.1 
Institutional Investors 13.1 
         . Insurance Companies 1.1 
         . Pension funds 10.0 
         . Investment Funds 1.9 
Other Financial intermediaries 1.1 
Total 100.0 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2008) 
 
Figure 3. Ireland GDP growth 2007-2014 
Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 4. Ireland’s property tax revenue percentage on total tax revenue from 2002 to 
2010 
 
Source: European Commission (2012) 
 
 
Table VIII. European Union countries foreign exposure to Irish banks, values in US$ 
billion in June 2010 





Ireland banks 47.5 3.3 18.9 2.9 8.8 31.3 
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Islandsbanki Arion Banki Landsbankinn 





















Early 2009 3.5 3.5 4.0 0 0 0 
March 2010 2.7 7.4 18.0 2.6 0.9 0 
September 2010 0 3.0 7.3 2.8 0 0.1 
March 2011 5.2 13.3 0 0 1.5 4.0 
Source: Honohan 2012 
 
Figure 5. Capital Adequacy Ratios of Iceland’s largest commercial banks 
Source: Íslandsbanki, Arion Banki and Landsbankinn financial statements 
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Table X. Ireland Credit Rating (Long Term/Foreign currency rating) 
 
Fitch Moody’s S&P 
2007 AAA Aaa AAA 
2008 AAA Aaa AAA 
2009 AA+ Aa1 AA 
2010 BBB+ Baa1 A 
2011 BBB+ Ba1 BBB+ 
2012 BBB+ Ba1 BBB 
2013 BBB+ Ba1 BBB+ 
2014 BBB+ Baa1 A- 
Source: Moody’s, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s rating services 
 
